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Abstract 
The paper first briefly reviews the extent to which profit maximising transport firms with identical 
cost functions and producing identical transport services pass-on output taxes to transport users 
under perfect competition, under different forms of imperfect competition and when they act as 
monopolists. Then the analysis is extended to derive the pass-on rates and activity reductions caused 
by an output tax when firms care both about profit and consumer surplus, produce symmetrically 
differentiated services and compete simultaneously in quantities and fare and when they collude.  
The pass-on rates and activity reductions are highest under collusion and lowest under Cournot 
competition when they produce complementary services. When they produce substitute services, 
the result is ambiguous and the competitive situation that yields highest pass-on depends on the 
firms’ objective functions and how fiercely they compete. Two important counterintuitive results are 
that the more intensely the firms compete and the more weight they put on consumer surplus, the 
higher the pass-on rates are.  
 
Keywords: Taxes, tax pass-through, pass-on rates, firms’ objectives, imperfect competition, collusion 
 
 
  
3 
 
1. Introduction 
Taxes on transport (and in general) can have three main purposes: (a) to raise revenues for the 
government to undertake government functions and provide goods or services that the market 
by itself would not typically provide (such as defence or the provision of roads), (b) to correct 
market failures (such as traffic congestion due to excessive demand for travel), and (c) to 
redistribute income or wealth from higher income groups to lower income groups. Examples 
of this last type include higher income earners paying higher tax rates on their income than 
lower income earners, and wealthier road users paying a congestion tax, which is then used to 
improve public transport for lower income groups. This congestion tax can be corrective,
1
 
raise revenues to fund public transport and redistribute wealth, all at the same time. 
The effects of a quantity (i.e., per unit) tax on transport users, transport operators and market 
size under perfect competition have been thoroughly discussed, and the model is readily 
available in ordinary microeconomics textbooks, such as Varian (2003), Nicholson (2005) and 
Frank (2006). The pass-on rate of taxes to demanders when firms are profit maximising 
monopolists are, however, more scarcely dealt with in the same textbooks, but several articles 
and reports deal with this issue (see for example Bulow and Pfleiderer, 1983; Ten Kate and 
Niels, 2005; Jørgensen et al., 2011; Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). Ten Kate and Niels (2005) and 
Weyl and Fabinger (2013) also discuss the cost pass-on to consumers in cases of imperfect 
competition whilst Jørgensen et al. (2011) focus on aviation charges in particular and to what 
extent an air transport company operating as a monopolist will pass them to consumers under 
different assumptions regarding its demand and cost functions. 
None of the above mentioned research or, to our knowledge, other research, has dealt with the 
question of to what extent oligopolistic firms pass the tax along to consumers when they have 
other goals beyond traditional profit maximization. These issues are particularly relevant as 
far as taxing of transport activity is concerned. Although there are good reasons to believe that 
many transport operators are not pure profit maximisers and there is a substantive literature on 
the impact of management objectives on transport pricing (Nash, 1978; Glaister and Lewis, 
1978; Jørgensen and Pedersen, 2004; Jørgensen and Preston, 2007 and Clark et al., 2009) 
there has not been much research on the pass-on rate of taxes from producers to consumers in 
                                                             
1
 Corrective taxes are also called ‘Pigouvian’ taxes, in honour of Arthur Pigou (Pigou,1920) who first 
suggested the use of these taxes to internalise externalities. His work is often a standard reference in 
transport economics textbooks; see for example Button (2010). 
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the transport sector. Also, how the effects of taxes vary with different forms of imperfect 
competition between transport operators who are not pure profit maximisers and in particular 
how intensely they compete, are somewhat neglected issues.  
Given the above, the aim of this paper is to bring transport firms’ goals and the market 
structure in which they operate together in one model and then discuss the effects on transport 
users’ prices and demand of an equal per unit tax on all suppliers. In line with Jørgensen and 
Pedersen (2004), Jørgensen and Preston (2007) and Clark et al. (2009) we assume that 
transport firms maximise a weighted sum of profits and consumer surplus. 
There are two reasons for our choice of goal function for transport firms. First, public bodies 
and/or local interests in many countries hold a considerable amount of shares in transport 
firms serving both local markets (bus transport, fast craft services) and national/ international 
markets (rail and air transport firms).
2
 Second, managers often have some power to pursue 
their own goals (Williamson, 1974). Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that transport 
operators are not typically pure profit maximisers. Moreover, we assume one (monopoly or 
collusion case) or two suppliers who compete simultaneously in either quantities (Cournot) or 
prices (Bertrand). 
Welfare impacts from taxation can be assessed according to the incidence of a tax, defined as 
the ratio of the tax borne by consumers to that borne by producers, which in turn depends on 
the pass-on rate (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). In this paper we find the pass-on rate from 
producers to consumers within different market settings and a weighted producer’s goal 
function in the transport sector. This has important implications for policy makers and 
practitioners interested in understanding the welfare impacts of a tax. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we briefly review the determinants of the 
degree of pass-on rates to transport users when suppliers are profit maximisers operating 
                                                             
2
 In Norway, for example, public bodies in 2004 held the majority of shares in 36 of the 95 bus 
companies (Mathisen and Solvoll, 2008). The states of Norway, Sweden and Denmark held 14%, 21% 
and 14% of the shares in the dominant air company (SASBraathen) in Scandinavia and the French 
government is a shareholder, albeit with less than 20% of the shares, of Air France-KLM. There is also 
some degree of public ownership of other air and rail companies in many European countries, see 
Blauwens et al. (2008); Clark et al. (2009) and Button (2010). In the US, the Washington Metropolitan 
Area Transit Authority, a government agency, operates all public transport in the Washington DC 
metropolitan area, including rail and underground, buses, and vans for the disabled.  
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under different competitive situations. In section 3 we present duopoly models when firms 
have mixed goals. Using the results from section 3, in section 4 we discuss the impacts of a 
per unit tax on prices and level of quantity transported. We do so paying particular attention to 
how the weight transport firms place on profit versus consumer surplus, and how the industry 
structure in which they operate (collusion, Bertrand competition, or Cournot competition) 
together with the intensity with which they compete influence the impact of the tax on prices 
and demand. Lastly, in section 5 we summarise the most important results and their policy 
implications. 
2.The pass-on rate for profit maximising transport firms  – a brief review 
2.1 Definition of tax pass-on rate 
The per unit tax pass-on rate can be defined as the ratio between the change in price and the 
change in tax. In other words, it measures the impact that an infinitesimal change of a per unit 
tax,  ,on the final output (passengers, tonnes, etc) has on the equilibrium price,   , and can be 
described by  
   
  
. Examples in transport economics include air transport fare increases when 
airlines face higher landing fees or new taxes or charges per passenger, higher costs of 
transporting goods by sea when shipping companies have to pay higher harbour charges per 
tonne loaded or reloaded, to name just a couple. The lower (higher) the value of 
   
  
, the less 
(more) of the tax increase is paid by consumers and the more (less) is paid by the producer. 
When 
   
  
      the final price (tax inclusive) to users goes up by more than, the same as or 
less than the amount of the tax.  
In this section we briefly review the pass-on rates under the most common types of market 
competition between transport firms. 
2.2 Perfect competition 
This market structure applies in particular to road freight and sea freight in most European 
countries and it has also become more common in some passenger transport industries since 
the 1980s
3
, although perhaps not as much as it would have been expected (see Blauwens et 
al., 2008).  
                                                             
3
 In air transport, this trend started with the Air Deregulation Act of 1978 in the US. In Europe, three 
airline liberalisation packages were introduced progressively between 1988 and 1997 (Graham and 
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Suppose   is price,   the number of units (tonnes, passengers, etc) transported,   the tax per 
unit transported and        and        denote the supply function and demand 
functions, respectively. The effect on the equilibrium price,   , of the tax is then given by, see 
for example Nicholson (2005) or Weyl and Fabinger (2013): 
                              
   
  
  
  
     
   where     
     
  
 
 
    
     
  
 
 
                                      (1) 
   and   , thus, denote elasticities of supply and demand with respect to fare, respectively. 
Since      and      it follows from (1) that imposing a tax per unit will increase the 
equilibrium price     . This increase depends on the shapes of the demand and supply curves; 
it is easily seen from (1) that consumers bear a higher burden of the tax the more elastic the 
supply (higher   ) and the more inelastic the demand (lower    in absolute value) and vice 
versa. If, for example,          and         
   
  
     , transport users in this case pay 
43% and suppliers pay 57% of the tax increase. In the special cases when the elasticity of 
supply tends to infinity or the elasticity of demand tends to zero, the users bear all the tax 
burden. Weyl and Fabinger (2013) expand these results and find the formula for the incidence 
of a finite tax change (rather than an infinitesimal change). This is obtained by replacing the 
pass-on rate by its quantity-weighted average over the range of the tax change. 
2.3 One supplier (monopoly) 
A monopoly is a market structure that has only one seller who offers a product or service with 
no close substitutes. The deregulation trend observed in many transport markets in a number 
of countries since the late 1970s has, as emphasised above, increased competition to some 
extent. Yet, some transport suppliers can still act as monopolists, at least when it comes to 
passenger transport between certain destinations (Blauwens et al., 2008). Dobruszkes (2009) 
finds that although the liberalisation of the intra-European air market has increased 
competition very few routes are actually served by a significant number of competitors. 
Barcelona-Belfast is, for example, only served by one airline. The same is the case between a 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Guyer, 2009). The third package gradually introduced freedom to provide services within the 
European Union, including cabotage, so that an airline of one Member State was allowed to offer a 
route within another Member State (IATA website). Open Skies are also very common. These are 
bilateral and multilateral air transport agreements, aimed at increasing competition. The US and the 
EU signed an important such agreement in 2007, which became operational in 2008. 
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number of destinations in Norway. In the United States the only train company for interurban 
passenger travel is Amtrak, a clear monopoly. 
Differentiating the first order conditions for profit maximisation with respect to tax     we 
get, after some mathematical manipulation (see Bulow and Pfleiderer, 1983 and Ten Kate and 
Niels, 2005):
 4
  
                                               
      
     
  
 
     
                                  
    
                                            
where         and    ) denote the monopolist’s optimum price, demand function and cost 
function, respectively. 
Equation (2) yields several interesting conclusions. First, when the demand and cost functions 
are linear (           it follows that 
   
  
     , meaning that the transport firm will 
always pass half of the tax along to transport users, no matter how steep these functions are. 
Second, when the cost function is convex         and the demand function, linear, 
   
  
      , and the transport firm will always pass-on less than half of the tax amount to 
users. Third, under the assumption that the monopolist must have non-negative profits                        
             , the cost function is linear and the demand function is convex       
  , 
   
  
    , and the firm will always pass-on more than half of the tax to users.5 Fourth, 
when both the demand and cost functions are convex, 
   
  
       ; and so the firm may 
pass-on more than, just, or less than half of the tax. 
Weyl and Fabinger (2013) extend the analysis of pass-on rates in a monopoly setting to 
include log-convex and log-concave demand functions and highlight that a monopolist pass-
on rate under linear cost actually exceeds 1 when the demand is log-convex. They cite Seade 
(1985) and Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) as the pioneers of this finding. Also, like they do for 
perfect competition, Weyl and Fabinger (2013) also expand the result for non-infinitesimal 
                                                             
4
 Here and throughout the paper    
  
  
      
   
   
  etc. 
5
 In Jørgensen et al. (2011) it is shown that for the specific demand functions           where a > 
0, b > 1 and            where c,d > 0, it follows that 
   
  
 
 
   
 and 
   
  
  , respectively, given a 
linear cost function.  
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tax changes. The relevant average pass-on rate in a monopoly is the markup-weighted average 
pass-on taken over values of   , where    is the quantity of the good or service that 
exogenously entered the market and markup is defined as price minus marginal cost. The 
authors essentially consider the exogenous entrance into the market of a quantity of the good 
  , and if    continues to denote the total quantity sold in the market, the monopolist now only 
sells       
2.4 Oligopoly 
Oligopoly is a market structure in which there are a small number of producers. Because the 
number is small, the actions of one firm influence and are influenced by the rivals’ actions. 
This market situation is commonplace for many passenger transport markets. In Europe, for 
example, one or two suppliers on many routes are commonplace in air transport, despite the 
opening of the air transport market to competition, a point we already highlighted in the 
previous section. Hamburg-Budapest, Hamburg-Berlin and Hamburg-Düsseldorf are 
examples of routes served by just two airlines (Dobruszkes, 2009, Table 1, p.31). In Great 
Britain most train routes are served by one or two companies. These are franchises from the 
government to private operators to serve specific routes.
6
  
In order to obtain fairly simple and unambiguous results on tax pass-on rates for different 
kinds of competition, we assume that all N firms have equal linear demand and cost functions; 
that is, they have the same cost structure and produce homogenous services.
7
 Taking the 
results in Ten Kate and Niels (2005), Carlton and Perloff (2005)  and Clark et al. (2009) as 
starting points, we can derive the following conclusions regarding the effects on equilibrium 
price       of imposing a per unit tax     on all   suppliers: 
 Under simultaneous quantity competition (Cournot), 
    
  
 
 
   
 , where     is the 
Cournot equilibrium price. The value of 
    
  
 increases with N but is always below 1. 
This means that the pass-on rate to transport users increases as the number of 
                                                             
6
 Some standard-class train fares are regulated by the government in Great Britain. These are typically 
commuter tickets for travel at peak times. 
7
 Kate and Niels (2005) show some rules of thumb for pass-on rates under Cournot competition when 
the demand and cost functions are non-linear. Weyl and Fabinger (2013) provide a comprehensive 
analysis of pass-on rates and tax incidence in virtually all possible market settings. 
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competitors increase; when for example      and   , 
    
  
 is     and    , 
respectively.  
 Under sequential quantity competition (Stackelberg), the pass-on rate is  
    
  
 
    
  
  
where      is  the equilibrium price. Also for the Stackelberg case  the pass-on rate to 
transport users increases as the number of firms increase; for example, when       
and   , 
    
  
 is 3   and    , respectively. For a given number of competitors, the 
pass-on rate is always higher under Stackelberg competition than under Cournot 
competition.  
 Under simultaneous fare competition (Bertrand), 
    
  
 = 1, where     is the 
equilibrium price. The transport operators will, thus, pass-on exactly the amount of the 
tax to users. 
 The equilibrium price under  sequential fare competition       is  the same as under 
Bertrand competition (         and the transport firms will pass all the tax along to 
users; that is, 
    
  
     
2.5 Summary of results for profit maximising firms 
The pass-on rate to transport users from profit maximising firms operating under perfect 
competition depends on the shapes of the demand and supply curves; the more inelastic the 
demand and the more elastic the supply, the more are users penalised by the tax. 
The pass-on rate to users from firms operating as monopolists critically depends on the forms 
of the demand and cost functions; it can vary from nearly zero (convex cost functions) to 
more than one (convex demand functions). When both functions are linear the monopolist 
will pass-on exactly half of the tax to consumers, regardless of the steepness of the functions.  
Under Cournot and Stackelberg competition with linear demand and cost functions and 
homogenous transport services, the firms will pass more than half of the tax along to users. 
For a given number of suppliers the pass-on rate is higher under Stackelberg competition than 
under Cournot competition. Moreover, as the number of suppliers increases they will pass-on 
more of the tax to consumers. The latter result is probably in conflict with what many think. 
Under all types of price competition the firms will pass-on the whole tax to transport users for 
all common forms of demand and cost functions. The marginal cost faced by a producer 
10 
 
consists of the production cost     and the tax that must be paid    . If a firm attempts to 
undercut the rival and pass on a lower tax than the unit tax it must pay, then it will supply the 
entire market whilst the other firm(s) will have no demand; however it will make a loss on 
each unit sold. Attempting to sell at a price higher than the marginal production cost plus tax 
will lead to other firms undercutting and a demand of zero. Neither of these actions can be an 
equilibrium and hence the equilibrium is achieved when all firms pass on the entire tax. Note 
that it is the discontinuity of the demand function facing each firm that drives the results here.  
 The same situation occurs under perfect competition when the supply curve is flat or the 
demand curve is vertical. In intermediate cases atomistic behavior by firms leads to a market 
equilibrium in which only a fraction of the tax is passed on to consumers. At market level an 
increase in the total marginal cost to the producers leads to lower product demand and lower 
supply. The amount of the tax that can be passed on to consumers is higher when the demand 
is less elastic; in this case the price to consumers increases substantially and the share of tax 
left to be paid by suppliers is relatively small. This is also the case when supply is elastic. 
When demand is more elastic the tax burden on the suppliers tends to be larger. Note that this 
conclusion is contingent on all suppliers producing identical services. If not, our later analysis 
shows that price competition does not necessarily imply full pass-on to consumers, even 
though the firms maximise profits, see Figure 1. 
3. Equilibrium prices and quantities when transport firms have mixed goals and 
produce different services 
All the results in section 2 assume profit maximising firms that produce homogeneous 
transport services. In this section we relax both assumptions. Transport operators have mixed 
goals and produce symmetrically differentiated services. We focus on the cases where two 
firms compete simultaneously in quantity (Cournot), in fares (Bertrand) and when they 
collude. In this section we present the model that makes the basis for our discussion in section 
4 about tax pass-on rates and changes in quantity transported caused by a per unit tax. In order 
to focus on tax effects in particular, the model builds up on the model developed by Clark et 
al. (2009) by introducing a per unit tax     in the firms’ cost functions. For a thorough 
discussion of the model and its choice of users’ utility function and of goal function for the 
transport operators and other functional assumptions, we refer to Singh and Vives (1984), 
Lewis and Sappington (1988), Jørgensen and Preston (2007) and Clark et al. (2009).  
3.1 The model 
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In order to get tractable mathematical expressions for the demand functions and for consumer 
surplus, we assume, in line with Sing and Vives (1984), that a representative transport user’s 
utility     depends on the level of use of the services supplied by transport firm 1,   , and 
transport firm 2,   , in the following way: 
                           
 
2
2
),(
2
221
2
1
2121
XXsXX
XXXXU

                                         (3) 
where           measures the degree of substitutability between the services offered by the 
firms; when      the services are perfect complements, when     they are independent 
and when     they are perfect substitutes. Hence, when     and increases (decreases in 
absolute terms), the degree of complementarity between the services decreases, when     
and increases the services become closer substitutes. The highly used utility function above 
implies, thus, that the degree of competition between the firms can be described in a simple 
way by the value of    
Transport firms can be substitutes in one market and complements in another market. For 
example, when transport firms offer transport services between the same destinations they 
produce substitute services and the more similar (or substitutable) the services are the higher 
the value of  . Two bus companies running services with similar characteristics along the 
same routes are substitutes. These two same bus companies may be complements in another 
market. For example, some inter-city routes may be offered by just one of the two firms, and 
some routes may not be financially viable so there may be points of interchange. In that case, 
passengers would travel from A to B by one company and then transfer to another bus run by 
the other company, and travel from B to C. Other examples of complementarity in transport 
include trains and buses, some routes (intra and inter-city) are only covered by trains, whereas 
others are only covered by buses. Passengers flying to and from airports typically need to 
travel to and from the airport, and this is not done by plane but rather by some surface 
transport mode. Moreover, due to the well established hub-and-spoke networks airlines may 
produce complement services on some routes and substitute services on other routes. 
When ignoring the income effect,
8
 the transport user maximises his consumer surplus, which 
can be described by iii XPXXUCS  
2
121 ),( , where iP  is the price paid for the services 
                                                             
8
 When there are no income effects, Equivalent Variation = Compensating Variation = change in 
Consumer Surplus. When there are income effects, Willig (1976) shows that change in consumer 
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provided by firm i and i=1,2. The consumer surplus’ maximisation yields the following direct 
demand functions for the two services: 
                
 
   
 
  
    
 
   
    
    
 
   
 
  
    
 
   
    
                                    
Inverting the demand system in (4) yields the following inverse demand functions 
                                                                                                                                   
The transport firms, thus, produce symmetrically differentiated services.
9
 Equations (4) and 
(5) show that using our chosen utility function leads to simple and easily tractable demand 
functions. Other special cases of the commonly used CES utility function (constant elasticity 
of substitution) such as the Cobb-Douglas function give either unrealistic demand functions 
(Cobb-Douglas implies constant shares of income devoted to each service) or to complicated 
(non-linear) demand functions (see for example Nicholson, 2005). 
Assume, for example, demands of   
  and   
  for firms 1 and 2, respectively. Plugging 
equations (3) and (5) into 
iii XPXXUCS  
2
121 ),(  gives the following expression for total 
consumer surplus,    : 
                                           
  
     
       
   
 
 
                                                                             
Moreover, assume that the firms have the following identical cost functions,             and 
pay the same tax (   per unit of output: 
                                                                    
Equations (5) and (7) can be plugged into the standard profit expression to yield the following 
expressions for the firms’ profits,              
                                                                                                                                                                                              
surplus can be used to estimate the (unobservable) compensating and equivalent variations and shows 
that in most applications the error of the approximation is very small. The error depends on (a) the 
ratio of the absolute value of consumer surplus to consumer’s initial income (which can be interpreted 
as a measure of proportional change in real income due to a price change), which in most applications, 
he argues, is very small and (b) the income elasticity of demand, which in most cases is close to 1. 
9
 The firms produce symmetrically differentiated services since 
   
   
 = 
   
   
 
 
    
. An  -value of, for 
example, 0.4 (-0.4) implies that 
   
   
 = 
   
   
 = 0.48 (-0.48) and 
   
   
 = 
   
   
 = -1.19 (-1.19). 
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Instead of the firms being pure profit maximisers, they now maximise a weighted sum 
(            of their profits and transport users’ total consumer surplus       
                                                                                                                  
In (9) we assume that both firms have the same objective function (same value of  ) and that 
both are concerned about users’ consumer surplus     , including that of those users that 
choose the rival firm’s services. This is a reasonable assumption when both transport 
operators serve the same population and when local businesses and local authorities have 
substantial equity interest in them.  
When     the firms are pure profit maximisers and when       they place equal weight 
on profits and consumer surplus. If we assume a tax deadweight loss of zero and marginal 
social costs of service provision are      , then the transport operators maximise social  
surplus when they put equal weight on profits and consumer surplus (       and compete 
in prices or collude.
10
 In intermediate cases the firms put a higher weight on profits than on 
consumer surplus.  
Of course, our choice of objective function is open to debate. First, the more power the 
managers have compared to the owners (Williamson, 1974), the less likely it is that the 
companies will be concerned about total consumer surplus because their status and reputation 
among users are dependent on how users evaluate their services compared to those of their 
rivals. Second, if the firms are international transport companies with different countries of 
registration it is unlikely that they will be concerned about the welfare of the rivals’ users. 
Consequently, our goal function is most suitable when companies compete in a local, rather 
than an international, setting. 
Nevertheless, assuming that producers have other objectives on top of profit maximisation is, 
as we emphasised in section 1, in many cases more realistic,. For a thorough discussion of the 
goal function above as far as transport suppliers are concerned, we refer to Jørgensen and 
Preston (2007) and Clark et al. (2009). 
                                                             
10
 It follows from equations (10) and (14) that equilibrium prices under  Bertrand and collusion are 
equal to       when         When the firms compete in quantities (Cournot), equation (12) shows, 
however, that the equilibrium price differs from       when       and       
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3.2 Market solutions for different kinds of competitive situations 
Simultaneous fare competition (Bertrand) 
Under Bertrand competition the firms maximise their objective functions            by 
setting prices strategically. Plugging equations (4), (6), (7) and (8) in (9) gives the following 
common equilibrium price      and common equilibrium quantity      for the firms: 
                                   
                      
              
                                                          
and  
                                 
            
                     
                                                               
 
Simultaneous quantity competition (Cournot) 
Under Cournot competition the transport operators maximise their objective functions by 
choosing the quantities they will supply. Using equations (5) to (9) gives the following 
common equilibrium           and common equilibrium quantity     for the firms: 
                             
                        
              
                                                      
and  
                                     
            
              
                                                                            
Collusion 
When the firms collude they maximise a weighted sum of their total profit          
and total consumer surplus      ; that is,                     . Then we get the 
following equilibrium price       and quantity        for the firms:11 
                                                             
11
 In this case the solutions are the same regardless of whether the firms use fare or quantity as their 
decision variable. 
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and 
                                                
            
           
                                                                       
Stability and existence conditions 
The restrictions previously imposed on the values of      and       secure that all 
numerators and denominators are positive in the expressions for equilibrium prices and 
quantities above, implying that                       . These results will be used 
later on. Clark et al. (2009) also show that the bindings on     and       are sufficient to 
conclude that interior equilibria exist for all competitive situations described above.
12
 
Given the conditions above, it is straightforward to verify from equations (10) – (15) that all 
equilibrium prices (quantities) are increasing (decreasing) in costs and decreasing (increasing) 
the greater emphasis the firms place on consumer surplus and the more intensely they 
compete; that is,     /   > 0,      /       /      and     /   < 0,      /       /   
                  
Before moving on to section 4, it should be highlighted that, from a mathematical point of 
view, because for Bertrand and for Cournot each firm maximises a weighted average of their 
own profits and the full consumer surplus, that consumer surplus counts twice. In the 
collusive case both firms maximise a weighted average of total profits plus the consumer 
surplus, and consumer surplus only enters the maximisation problem once. The reason for the 
difference in the maximisation problem set up is, as highlighted above, that each firm is 
concerned about users’ consumer surplus, including the consumer surplus of those users that 
choose the rival firm’s services. Although this assumption is both reasonable and necessary, 
from a mathematical point of view, the comparison of the equilibrium solutions for Cournot 
and Bertrand with the collusive should be taken with caution. 
  
4 Tax influence under mixed goals and for different competitive situations 
                                                             
12
 For a thorough discussion of stability conditions in oligopoly in general, see Sead (1980). 
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4.1 The pass-on rates 
Using equations (10), (12) and (14) we can now derive the pass-on rates, represented by the 
derivatives of the equilibrium prices with respect to tax for the Bertrand case, the Cournot 
case and the collusion case, respectively. Thus: 
 
                                           
    
  
 
     
              
                                                       
and  
                                  
    
  
 
          
              
                                                          
and 
                                             
       
  
 
     
    
                                                                          
 
Under the restrictions placed on the values of   and   it is easy to verify that all three 
derivatives above are positive, which means that the transport firms pass-on at least part of 
the tax to consumers, regardless of the weight the firms put on profits versus consumer 
surplus (value of    and their competitive situation. It can also be deduced from the 
formulae above that 
    
  
 
       
  
   when        , which means that under price 
competition and collusion the prices to consumers will never go up by more than the amount 
of the tax.  
Under quantity competition, however, it follows from equation (17) that  
    
  
  >) 1 
when      
    
 
 . This condition implies that operators will always pass-on less than the 
tax amount to consumers when they produce complementary services; that is,  
    
  
    
when        The same is the case when they only put weight on profits         Only 
when the firms produce substitute services (     and are not pure profit maximisers 
(     can the pass-on rate be higher than 1 (but not exceed 2) and the more fiercely the 
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firms compete, the higher the pass-on rate is. In the special case when the firms put equal 
weight on profits and consumer surplus         the pass-on rate is unambiguously higher 
than 1 when they produce substitute services       13                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
A closer look at the derivatives above enables us to derive the following rankings of the pass-
on rates: 
    
  
 
    
  
 
       
  
                   
    
  
 
    
  
 
       
  
                     
    
  
 
       
  
 
    
  
         
    
  
 
    
  
  
       
  
                   
    
  
 
    
  
 
       
  
                     
When the transport operators produce substitute services      , users are the least penalised 
by the tax when the operators collude, given that they give a higher weight to profits than to 
consumer surplus (β < 0.5). When the firms weigh profit and consumer surplus equally (β = 
0.5) the pass-on rate is highest under Cournot competition but equal to 1 both when the firms 
collude and when they compete in fares. Users bear a higher (lower) burden of the tax under 
Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition  when       
 
    
 . Consequently, 
the more intensely the firms compete (  increases) and the lower weight they put on consumer 
surplus (  dercreases), the more likely it is that users are more penalised when the firms 
compete in prices than quantities, given that they produce substitute services.  
Some of the conclusions above are reversed when the firms produce complementary services 
       When they put less weight on consumer surplus than profits (β < 0.5) the pass-on 
rate is then highest when the firms collude and lowest when they compete in quantities. The 
pass-on rates are, however, still equal to 1 when the firms collude or compete in fares and 
give the same weight to profit and consumer surplus (β = 0.5).  
                                                             
13
 The fact that the pass-on rate under Cournot can be higher than 1, is verified in Delipalla and Keen 
(1992, p356) when the firms produce homogeneous services.  
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Note that the above conclusions differ to some extent from the literature review results in 
section 2 in which we concluded that the pass-on rates under Cournot competition are always 
lower than one and equal to one under Bertrand competition. The main reason for this is that 
in the literature review it is assumed that all the firms produce identical services and are profit 
maximisers, whilst our model assumes they produce symmetrical differentiated services and 
may have other goals on top of profit maximisation. 
Moreover, after some mathematical manipulation we get the following cross derivative 
expressions using equations (16), (17) and (18): 
 
                          
     
    
 
   
                 
                                                   
        
     
    
 
         
                 
                                                    
           
      
    
 
      
                 
                                                               
               
     
    
 
           
                 
                                                                           
 
                   
        
    
 
 
       
          
        
    
                                                                 
 
When the services are not perfect substitutes (     it follows from equations (19), (21) and 
(23) that for all competitive situations firms will pass-on more of the tax to transport users the 
higher the weight they place on consumer surplus relative to profit (higher  ). Also, given that 
the firms do not collude, the less complementary the services the firms produce are or the 
more intensely the firms compete (higher   , the greater the share of the tax that will be paid 
by users, except for the case when the firms compete in fares (Bertrand) and weigh profit and 
consumer surplus equally         14 Finally, when the firms collude, the pass-on rate is, as 
                                                             
14
 The nominator in (20),            , is zero when          
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expected, just as much unaffected by the value of    or the demand relationship between their 
services.  
Using equations (16), (17) and (18) the pass-on rates when the firms compete in fares, in 
quantities and when they collude are shown graphically in Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3, 
respectively. In each figure the relationships between pass-on rates and how intensely they 
compete (value of    are drawn when they maximise profits (β = 0), when they place 2.3 
times higher weight on profits than consumer surplus (β = 0.3)15 and when they weigh profits 
and consumer surplus equally (β = 0.5).  
 
 
Figure 1. Tax pass-on rates from the firms when they compete in fares. 
 
                                                             
15
 When β = 0.3, (1-β) = 0.7 and the firms weigh profits 2.3 times higher than consumer surplus. 
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Figure 2. Tax pass-on rates from the firms when they compete in quantities.  
 
 
Figure 3. Tax pass-on rates from the firms when they collude.  
The figures above support previous conclusions; the higher the weight the firms put on 
consumer surplus relative to profits (higher     the higher the pass-on rates are for all 
competitive situations. Moreover, comparing the lines in the figures above we can conclude 
that when the firms put less weight on consumer surplus than on profits        , and 
produce substitute (complementary) services the pass-on rates are higher (lower) when they 
compete than when they collude. Additionally, Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that the pass-on 
rates under Bertrand (Cournot) competition increase convexly (concavely) with   when 
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     . When      , however, the figures show that the pass-on rates are unaffected by 
  when the firms compete in prices and increase linearly with   when the firms compete in 
quantities. Under collusion the pass-on rates are always unaffected by  .  
4.2 The influence of the tax on quantity transported 
As emphasised earlier, one important reason to impose taxes on transport operators is to 
influence the level of activity, for example, if this is deemed to be excessive (i.e., inefficient 
from an economic point of view).
16
 Let us, therefore, have a closer look on how a per unit tax 
on output influences the total number of units transported in our model setting. Using 
equations (11), (13) and (15) and bearing in mind that the total number of units transported 
under Bertrand, Cournot and Collusion is             and        , respectively, we get the 
following derivatives: 
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All derivates above are negative, which means that imposing a higher tax per unit on the firms 
leads to lower quantities transported, regardless of how the firms weigh profit relative to 
                                                             
16
 This type of corrective tax may also be levied on transport users, and ideally should be equal to the 
marginal externality. However, per unit taxes on producers are sometimes more practical or politically 
more acceptable, even though they are not first best corrective taxes. Another reason for governments 
to introduce new taxes is simply to raise revenues, even if these taxes distort relative prices and 
economic agents’ decisions. 
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consumer surplus and their competitive environment. A further inspection of the derivatives 
above makes it possible to verify the following ranking: 
 
     
  
 
     
  
 
        
  
                    
     
  
 
     
  
         
 
    
 
     
  
 
     
  
           
     
  
 
     
  
 
        
  
                   
     
  
 
        
  
 
     
  
         
     
  
 
     
  
 
        
  
                   
     
  
 
     
  
 
        
  
                   
 
When all the derivatives above are negative we can conclude that for firms placing a higher 
weight on profits than on consumer surplus         a per unit tax has less negative impact 
on the total number of units transported when they collude than when they compete in either 
prices or quantities and produce substitute services        Moreover, when the firms 
produce substitute services to a moderate degree, implying that     
 
    
 , the tax has less 
negative impact on  the total number of units transported when they compete in quantities 
rather than prices.  When they weigh profit and consumer surplus equally         the tax  
has, however, the highest negative impact on  the total number of units transported under 
Cournot competition but its influence on the total number of units transported  is the same 
regardless of whether the firms compete in prices or collude. 
When the firms produce complementary services       and        some of the 
conclusions above are reversed; the tax influence on the total number of units transported is 
highest when the firms collude and lowest when they compete in quantities. Just like the 
impact of the tax on equilibrium prices is the same regardless of whether the firms collude or 
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compete in fares or quantities, the impact of the tax on the total number of units transported is 
also the same regardless of whether the firms collude or compete in fares or quantities if they 
produce independent services                                                                                                    
Finally, from equations (24), (25) and (26), it follows that 
                          
      
    
 
  
   
 
   
                 
                                     
 
      
    
 
                      
                       
                 
   
       
              
                                    
      
    
 
       
                 
                                                          
                           
      
    
 
            
                 
                                
        
         
    
 
  
            
          
         
    
  
         
              
         
 
Given that the firms do not produce identical services       the total number of units 
transported  will be more negatively affected by the tax the higher the weight the firms put on 
consumer surplus relative to profits (higher  ) for all competitive situations analysed here, as 
shown by equations (27), (29) and (31). Moreover, when the firms collude, increasing   leads 
to a lower negative impact of the tax on the total number of units transported for all actual 
values of  . Also when the firms compete in quantities and weigh profits more than consumer 
surplus        , increasing   leads to the tax having a lower negative impact on the total 
number of units transported. When the firms, however, weigh profit and consumer surplus 
equally        , the reduction in the total number of units transported due to a tax increase 
is unaffected by the value of   .17 Finally, it follows from equation (28) that when the firms 
compete in prices a per unit tax will have lower (higher) negative influence on the quantity 
transported when   increases, given that      
   
       
. Since              
   
       
 
when        When the firms produce complementary services (s    or not compete very 
                                                             
17
 The nominator in (30) is zero when          
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fiercely, a higher   leads to a lower impact of a per unit tax on the total number of units 
transported. When       the opposite may occur; the higher the weight the firms put on 
profits relative to consumer surplus (lower  ) the more likely it is that the impact of the tax on 
the total number of units transported will be higher when   increases.  
4.3 Summary of the most important results 
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the most important assumptions and results. 
Table 1: Most important assumptions of the model 
Consumers’ utility function  
2
2
),(
2
221
2
1
2121
XXsXX
XXXXU

  
Firms produce symmetrically 
differentiated services 
   
   
 
   
   
 
 
    
 
Firms’ objective function when they 
compete 
                          
                                             
Firms’ objective function when they 
collude 
                    
Firms’ costs functions                ,                  
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Table 2: Comparison of the impact of a per unit tax     on price and quantity for Cournot, 
Bertrand and Collusion for different degrees of substitutability between the services     and 
different weights on consumer surplus and profits     
Degree of 
competition  and 
firms’ goals                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Effect on quantities compared Effect on prices compared 
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5. Concluding remarks 
The paper first briefly reviews the tax pass-on rates for profit maximising transport firms 
producing identical services under different types of competition. The pass-on rates under 
perfect competition (monopoly) are critically dependent on the shapes of the supply (cost) and 
demand functions. Under Bertrand and sequential price competition the firms pass the entire 
tax on to users whilst the pass-on rates under quantity competition are lower than one. The 
firms will pass on more of the tax to the users under Stackelberg competition than under 
Cournot competition and the pass-on rate increases in both cases with the number of 
competitors. It is worth noting that even profit maximising monopolists do not necessarily 
pass-on all the tax to users and given linear costs and demand functions they always pass half 
of the tax on to the users, which is less than the fraction that firms under all types of imperfect 
competition pass-on.  
Then the paper proceeds to analyse to what extent transport firms pass a per unit tax on output 
on to transport users and the subsequent impact the tax has on users’ demand: (1) when the 
firms compete simultaneously in prices (Bertrand), in quantities (Cournot) and when they 
collude; (2) when the degree of complementarity or substituability between the firms’ services 
differs; and (3) when the firms put different weights on profits and consumer surplus. The 
analysis is carried out assuming firms produce symmetrically differentiated transport services 
and have identical cost and goal functions. Their goal function is a weighted sum of profits 
and consumer surplus. The paper shows, as expected, that all equilibrium prices (quantities) 
increase (decrease) when the government imposes a tax on outputs. This means that the 
transport firms in all cases pass at least part of the tax on to transport users. The pass-on rates 
differ, however, significantly with the transport firms’ objective function and the market 
structure they operate in. Only when the firms produce independent services (     the pass-
on rates are the same for all three market structures described here.  
When the firms produce substitute services (      and place a higher weight on profits than 
on consumer surplus         the pass-on rates are lowest when they collude. Whether 
Cournot competition or Bertrand competition yields the highest pass-on rate is ambiguous. It 
depends on the relative magnitudes of   and  : the less fiercely the firms compete (low but 
positive  ) and the more weight they place on consumer surplus (high  ) the more likely it is 
that the pass-on rates will be higher under Cournot. When the firms put equal weight on 
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profits and consumer surplus         the pass-on rates are the same and equal to 1 when 
the firms collude and compete in prices and higher than 1 when they compete in quantities.  
Also when the firms produce complementary services      , the pass-on rates for Bertrand 
and collusion are the same and equal to 1 when the firms put equal weight on profits and 
consumer surplus (      . When the firms place less weight on consumer surplus than 
profits (        consumers are less penalised when the firms compete in quantities and most 
penalised when they collude. 
When the services provided by the firms are not perfect substitutes      , the pass-on rates 
are higher the higher the weight the transport operators place on consumer surplus relative to 
profits (  increases), regardless of whether they compete in prices, in quantities or collude. 
Since equilibrium prices always decrease when   increases, the above means that imposing 
higher taxes on outputs makes equilibrium prices less dependent on the firms’ objectives. 
Moreover, increasing   always leads to higher pass-on rates under Cournot competition. The 
same applies when the firms compete in fares and weigh profits more than consumer surplus 
(      , but the pass-on rate is less influenced by   in this case than under Cournot 
competition. When the firms weigh profits and consumer surplus equally         the pass-
on rate under Bertrand competition is independent of  . Under collusion, the pass-on rates are 
independent of the degree of complementarity or substitutability between the services. 
The tax impact on the total number of units transported is closely linked to its impact on the 
price faced by transport users (which in turn is linked to the pass-on rates). Higher (lower) 
pass-on rates yield higher (lower) reductions in the total number of units transported. 
Moreover, when the services are not perfect substitutes, taxing transport firms’ outputs always 
leads to higher reductions in the total number of units transported, the higher the weight the 
firms put on consumer surplus relative to profits.  
When the transport firms compete in quantities increasing   leads to lower reductions in the 
total number of units transported as a result of  the tax, given that they place more weight on 
profits than on consumer surplus (        When they value profits and consumer surplus 
equally         the impact of the tax on the total number of units transported is, however, 
unaffected by the value of    When the firms collude increasing   leads to lower reductions in 
the total number of units transported  as a result of the tax for all values of    Under Bertrand 
competition the conclusions are not so clear-cut. When the firms are also concerned about 
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consumers’ surplus       and compete intensely such that       the total number of units 
transported can be more affected by the tax the more fiercely the firms compete (  increases). 
When the firms run complementary services or substitute services to a limited degree 
        increasing   will moderate the impact of the tax on the total number of units 
transported; even though increasing   results in higher pass-on rates. 
Summing up, the most important message of the paper is that transport users are more 
penalised by an output tax imposed on transport firms the more concerned the firms are about 
users’ consumer surplus and the more intensely the firms compete. Publically owned transport 
firms, which probably place a higher weight on consumers’ surplus than private ones do, are 
typically perceived as unlikely to pass taxes on to users. Our model suggests that this belief is 
wrong. The intuition behind these results is that the firms’ marginal cost (including taxes) 
have a greater impact on their price setting the more fiercely they compete and the more 
weight they put on consumer surplus. Policy makers end to believe that profit maximising 
firms operating as monopolists or in areas with few suppliers pass-on most of the tax to users. 
Our model suggests that this belief may also be wrong; if for example, their demand functions 
are linear and their cost functions are linear (convex) monopolists will pass on half (less than 
a half) of the tax to  users (see section 2.3). 
The model constitutes a first step in formalising the pass-on rate and impact on quantity 
transported of a per unit tax when oligopolistic transport firms maximise a weighted sum of 
profits and consumer surplus. One caveat of the model is that because firms that compete in 
prices or quantities care about the consumer surplus of all transport users, including those that 
choose the rival firm’s services, the consumer surplus of all transport users enters two goal 
functions, so it counts twice, in contrast with the collusive case, where the consumer surplus 
of all transport users enters one goal function only, as the firms collude and act as one. The 
model also has a number of restrictive assumptions, the most important one being the linear 
set-up. The model could be extended to assess the impact of different pass-on rates on social 
welfare under different market structures and producers’ goal functions. In particular, one 
may allow a richer non-linear demand function and possibly employ a conduct parameter on 
the lines of Weyl and Fabinger (2013) in order to obtain more general conclusions.   
Our goal function allowed us to discuss the pass-on rate when transport firms put a different 
weight on profits compared to travellers’ welfare and to make our analysis more general than 
analyses which assume transport firms are pure profit maximisers. This is in particular 
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important when analysing local transport markets where public owners often hold a 
substantial part of the transport suppliers’ shares. On the other hand using a linear set-up and 
focusing on simultaneously competitive situations only limit the generality of the results. 
Despite these limitations, the paper has nevertheless, established a model to discuss the 
transport users’ burden of an output tax when the transport firms have goals that extend 
beyond profit maximation and produce transport services under  competitive situations that 
are common as far as transport markets are concerned. 
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